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Introduction
The unravelling prediction of the voluntary disclosure theory posits that firms (information senders) completely disclose information about the quality of their products provided the information disclosed is verifiable, and the costs of disclosure are negligible (Viscusi, 1978; Grossman & Hart, 1980; Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981 ; for a review see Milgrom, 2008) . This prediction requires that consumers (information receivers) hold correct beliefs through an iterative process of reasoning leading to the equilibrium where all non-disclosed information is viewed with extreme scepticism. 2 The logic behind unravelling rests on receiver's ability to make adverse inferences about non-disclosed information. Jin et al., (2017) , Penczynski & Zhang, (2017) , Brown et al., (2012) , Sah & Read (2017) , Deversi et al., (2018) show that one of the reasons unravelling can fail to occur is when receivers are too optimistic about nondisclosed information, given the sender's actual quality level. Recent papers have documented evidence in support of incomplete unravelling of information under voluntary disclosure settings (Jin & Leslie, 2003; Jin, 2005; Mathios, 2000; Benndorf et al., 2015; Luca & Smith, 2015) . This paper experimentally examines whether introducing competition between senders increases disclosure of information. We examine the effect of competition on information disclosure because we conjecture that if receivers prefer senders that disclose information over those that do not, then competition between senders may generate unravelling of information as senders may start competing in disclosing information to receivers in order to attract them. We conceptualise competition in this way as we believe it is intuitive and natural to observe competition between senders in field settings in a way where firms compete with each other to be able to trade with a consumer. 3 We further examine whether naivety about hidden information among receivers decreases with competition between senders. We believe that a second mechanism, i.e. comparative evaluation of information, will help attenuate strategic naivety in a setting with competing firms. Our conjecture is that comparing information that is revealed with information that is not revealed will affect consumer's inferences about nondisclosed information. This conjecture finds support in the social psychology and marketing literature which provides extensive evidence suggesting that human judgements are comparative in nature.
The comparative modes of evaluation may be deeply rooted in an individual's psyche such that individuals evaluate a given piece of information in relation to other pieces of information available to them which act as a standard for comparison (Dehaene et al., 1998 , Mussweiler, 2003 . For example, while deciding which firms' product to buy, consumers judge whether the product of firm A is better than the product of firm B on a given dimension and evaluate the products of the two firms in a comparative manner. The underlying mechanism for comparison to affect decision-making is that the presence of a standard influences judgements by making a particular knowledge unit accessible to the consumer (Higgins, 1996) . The more accessible a given piece of information is, the more likely it will be used in the decision-making process and the more likely it is to influence the decision (Bollinger et al., 2011) .
Since comparative evaluation forms a core mechanism in decision-making, we conjecture that comparing information that is disclosed with information that is not disclosed might help consumers make sceptical inferences about information that is not disclosed to them. In other words, the absence of a particular piece of information may be compared with a salient piece of information which might generate scepticism about the absent information and attenuate strategic naivety that is documented in the literature. This paper closely relates to the papers by Forsythe et al. (1989) and Penczynski & Zhang (2017) who study unravelling of information in an auction setting. Forsythe et al. (1989) find that the sequential equilibrium, where buyers "assume the worst", is reached through an unravelling process over the course of their experiment. Penczynski & Zhang (2017) also examine in an auction setting how the market structure and the information structure affect disclosure of information. They find that introducing competition between sellers increases disclosure of information, however, buyers do not compensate for sellers' selective disclosure of evidence in their bids and their welfare does not improve under competition. In this paper, we examine the role of competition in the amount of information that is disclosed by senders, and in addition, explore the effect of comparative evaluation of information on receivers' sophistication, which may also help increase disclosure of information in natural settings.
To examine how competition affects information unravelling and explore its effects on receiver sophistication, we design an experiment with two treatments, the 'Baseline' and the 'Competition' treatment, which builds on the design proposed by Jin et al. (2017) . There is one sender and one receiver in the Baseline, and two senders and one receiver in the Competition treatment. The basic setup of the experiment is as follows: the sender obtains a private number and decides whether to revel this number to the receiver or stay silent. If the sender has revealed the number, he cannot lie or misreport it which makes it a verifiable disclosure game. The receiver observes the sender's decision and the true number if it is revealed, or a blank message if it is not revealed by the sender. She then reports or guesses the number based on the sender's decision and on the probability distribution of the numbers, which is common knowledge. In the Competition treatment, the senders separately obtain a private number from the set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Senders simultaneously and individually decide whether to reveal their private number to the receiver. The receiver observes both senders' decision (alongside each other) and reports or guesses the value of the private number (of each sender).
The differences in the Competition treatment compared to the Baseline are that: a) there are two senders in the Competition treatment and, b) the receiver chooses her preferred sender after reporting the numbers of both senders. This choice of the receiver determines the probability with which a sender is selected by the computer to earn a payoff (specifically, the preferred sender is more likely to be selected). The sender selected by the computer earns a payoff based on the receiver's report, and the other sender earns zero. The receiver earns a payoff based on the accuracy of her report of the selected sender. The receiver's choice of the preferred sender introduces competition between senders.
We find that competition between senders significantly increases the amount of information that is disclosed to receivers. In particular, the intermediate numbers are more likely to be revealed in the presence of competition between senders. Our conjecture about the effect of comparative evaluation on receivers' sophistication fails to hold as competition does not attenuate receiver's naivety about non-disclosed information. We do not find significant differences in guesses of non-disclosed numbers by receivers across the Baseline and the Competition treatment. Interestingly, we find that the average payoff of receivers in the Competition treatment is higher than the average payoff of receivers in the Baseline despite no marked improvement in inferences about non-disclosed information. This effect is largely driven by a higher rate of information disclosure by senders in the Competition treatment which led receivers to report accurately when the senders revealed the number. We further find that naivety in receivers is driven by miscalibrated beliefs about the actions of senders with intermediate and high numbers rather than miscalibrated beliefs about the actions of senders with low numbers. That is, receivers underestimate how often intermediate and high numbers are revealed by senders but correctly estimate how often low numbers are revealed by senders.
Our findings suggest that even in the presence of strategically naïve consumers, competition in the marketplace can increase disclosure of information by firms. Therefore, tools that aim to increase competition between firms, which are at the disposal of regulators like the Competition and Markets Authority in the United Kingdom, can be used to generate increased disclosure of information.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the details of the design of the experiment. Section 3 presents the results. This section also outlines the welfare effects of competition on receivers and the role of beliefs in driving the decisions of senders and receivers. Section 4 discusses the results and offers some concluding remarks.
Experimental design
We design a sender-receiver game to examine whether competition between senders increases information disclosure and affects receivers' scepticism about non-disclosed information. The basic setup of our game is as follows: There are two player rolessenders and receivers. The sender observes a private number which is drawn from the set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Each of these numbers is equally likely to be generated and this probability distribution over the set of numbers is common knowledge. The sender then decides whether to reveal this number to the receiver or stay silent. If he decides to reveal the number, he cannot lie or misreport the true number and the receiver is sent this message from the sender: "The number I received is:" followed by the actual private number.
The receiver knows the number with certainty following this message from the sender. Otherwise, the receiver observes: "The number I received is:" followed by a blank. The receiver observes the sender's decision to reveal or not and must report or guess the true number of the sender from the set {1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4, 4.5, 5} . The incentives of the game are such that receivers earn a higher payoff if they report the true number accurately, and the senders earn a higher payoff when the receiver makes a higher report. The specific payoffs in the experiment are derived using the payoff functions as in Jin et al. (2017) . Subjects did not see these functional forms as the payoffs were shown in a table. 4 The payoff functions for the sender (US) and the receiver (UR) respectively are: = 110 -20 |5 -receiver's report| 1.4 = 110 -20 |actual private number -receiver's report| 1.4 When the receiver's action space is sufficiently rich, as in our experiment, the sequential equilibrium of the disclosure game, as shown by Milgrom (1981) , is such that the sender always reveals the true private number, unless it is the lowest number, i.e. private number 1 -in which case he is indifferent between revealing and not, and the receiver guesses the lowest number upon observing non-disclosure. 5 Based on the game described above, our experiment consists of two treatments -the Baseline and the Competition treatment. The treatments primarily vary based on the number of senders that are matched with the receiver: one in Baseline, and two in Competition. In addition, the receiver in the Competition treatment must choose her preferred sender. In the Competition treatment, the two senders are paired together, and the senders remain in their fixed pairs for the entire duration of the experiment which mimics competition between sellers in natural environments. We randomly rematch a receiver with a different sender [sender pair] in each round of the Baseline [Competition treatment] to minimise reputational effects that might drive disclosure decisions.
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects are assigned to one of the two roles, i.e. sender or receiver. They remain in these roles for the whole experiment. The subjects play 30 rounds of this game in both treatments and we do not provide feedback to subjects between rounds. The Baseline is akin to the "No feedback" treatment in Jin et al. (2017) where senders receive no feedback and receivers observe the draw if the sender decides to reveal, or no message if the sender does not reveal the draw. 6 In each round of the Competition treatment, the two senders receive numbers that are independently and uniformly drawn from the set of private numbers. The senders then individually and simultaneously decide whether to reveal their own number to the receiver or stay silent. After observing both senders' decision to reveal or not, the receiver must make reports about the true numbers of both senders. If no number is revealed, the receiver must 4 The specific payoffs are shown in Table A 1 in Appendix A. 5 We ensure richness in receiver's action space by allowing them to guess in increments of 0.5, i.e. 1.5, 2.5, 3.5, and 4.5. 6 The Baseline is a conceptual replication of the 'No feedback' treatment in Jin et al. (2017) who borrow elements from Cai and Wang (2006) and Wang et al. (2010) . We depart from Jin et al. (2017) by eliminating role reversal and eliciting beliefs every 5 rounds in an incentivised manner instead of eliciting them only once at the end of the 30 rounds. make a guess about the true numbers based on the sender's decision not to reveal. The receiver also chooses her preferred sender.
This choice of the preferred sender determines the probability with which the sender is selected by the computer to be matched with the receiver to earn a payoff for that round. The preferred sender is selected by the computer with a 75% probability and the non-preferred sender is selected by the computer with a 25% probability to be matched with the receiver to earn a payoff. This incentive mechanism ensures that the receiver is incentivised to choose her preferred sender as well as to report the number of the sender that she does not prefer. This helps us gain meaningful insights about the receiver's report even when the number is not disclosed, and when the receiver does not choose that sender. The receiver's choice of the preferred sender ensures that there is a conflict of interest between senders which is what we refer to as competition.
In both treatments, we also elicit subjects' beliefs about the actions of the other player after every 5 rounds (5 rounds = 1 block). 7 We incentivised each question in the belief elicitation stage using the scoring rule as in Kugler et al. (2007) : 70 -|Correct answer -Subject's answer|. Using responses to these questions and applying Bayes' rule, we infer what the receivers should have guessed based on the beliefs they held about the sender's strategy. Similarly, using the sender's responses to these questions, we infer what senders believed the receivers would guess upon observing non-disclosure. This gave us insights into the relationship between the senders' and receivers' actions and their beliefs.
After the final round of the experiment, subjects are paid for two different blocks at random -once for the decision-making stage, and once for the accuracy of the answers to the belief questions. We paid two different blocks to avoid subjects hedging their actions with their responses to the belief questions in the same block. This ensured incentive compatibility of both the beliefs and the actions of subjects. Subjects also answered a questionnaire where we obtained information on their gender, field of study, risk preference, social preferences using the questions in Falk et al. (2016) , cognitive ability using the three Cognitive Reflection Task questions (Frederick, 2005) , and scepticism level using the Hurtt's scepticism scale (Hurtt, 2010) .
The experiment was programmed on z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and was run at the Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics Laboratory at the University of Nottingham in April 2018. We used ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) to recruit 173 subjects from a diverse, mostly undergraduate, subject pool. 8 In total, we conducted 9 sessions, i.e. 3 sessions with two matching groups in each session for the Baseline, and 6 sessions for the Competition treatment with each session as one matching group. Each matching group in the Baseline comprised of 10 to 12 subjects, and each matching group in the Competition treatment comprised of 15 to 18 subjects. Subjects were paid in cash privately at the end of the experiment. Sessions lasted, on average, 70 minutes, and the average payment per subject was £12 which included a show-up fee of £4. Table 1 provides a summary of the senders' actions in the Baseline and the Competition treatment. In both treatments, on average, senders reveal higher draws more often than the lower draws. When the draw is 4 or 5, the revealing rate is above 90% in both the Baseline and the Competition treatment but not 100% as per the equilibrium prediction. The revealing rate drops below 75% in the Baseline and below 85% in the Competition treatment for draws of 2 and 3 even when full unravelling is the equilibrium prediction. In Panel A, the column "% revealed" reports the average revealing rate across all senders when they observed that particular draw. In Panel B, we report the total number of non-revealed draws and the average draw when senders did not disclose the draw in the respective treatments.
Results

Analysis of senders' behaviour Panel A in
According to the theoretical prediction, we expect to see non-disclosure at most 20% of the times since senders with draw 1 in both treatments are indifferent between revealing and not revealing the number in equilibrium. A non-parametric test (excluding draw 1 from the analysis) performed on the average revealing rate of each sender suggests that there is a deviation from the full unravelling equilibrium in both the Baseline and the Competition treatment even after allowing for a 10% deviation from the unravelling prediction due to error (Wilcoxon rank-sum test p<0.001 for both Baseline and Competition treatment). 9 9 All tests conducted on senders' data consider each sender as an independent unit of observation because senders did not receive any feedback between rounds. All tests conducted on receivers' data are conducted at the matching group level which is an independent unit of observation because receivers obtained information if the draw was revealed and the receivers were randomly re-matched with a different sender pair after each round. The tests conducted to compare treatment averages of receivers with senders consider each matching group as the independent unit of observation (for example: comparing the average non-disclosed draw with the average guess We next analyse revealing rates of specific draws by senders across treatments. Figure  1 displays the revealing rates by block for each draw across the Baseline and the Competition treatment. We find that senders in the Competition treatment reveal draws 2, 3, and 4 significantly more than the senders in the Baseline (Wilcoxon rank-sum test p=0.037 for draw 2, p=0.009 for draw 3, p=0.002 for draw 4). We do not find a significant difference in the revealing rates of draw 1 and 5 because a sender with draw 5 has no incentive to withhold the draw from the receiver in either treatments. In contrast, a sender with draw 1 has little reason to reveal in either treatment. Especially in the Competition treatment, a sender with draw 1 would never want to be chosen and hence, would never want to reveal a draw 1 due to the payoff structure.
The significant difference in revealing rates across the Baseline and the Competition treatment explains a lower average non-disclosed draw by senders in the Competition treatment than in the Baseline (1.854 in the Baseline and 1.616 in the Competition treatment), as shown in Panel B of Table 1 . This difference is statistically significant (Wilcoxon rank-sum test p<0.001). of the non-disclosed draw across treatments). This is because we use paired difference tests such as the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
To analyse differences in the revealing behaviour of senders in the Baseline and the Competition treatment further, we conduct a regression analysis of senders' decisions to reveal (1 if the draw is revealed and 0 if it is not revealed). Our regressor of interest is a treatment dummy indicator which takes the value of 1 for senders in the Competition treatment, and 0 for senders in the Baseline. Table 2 provides marginal effect estimates from a Probit estimation for three model specifications. The standard errors are clustered at the subject level as each sender is an independent unit of observation. This is because we do not provide feedback to senders between rounds in the experiment. Model I (column I) is a specification without any socio-demographic controls. We regress whether the sender reveals the draw in a given round on the Competition treatment dummy, individual draw dummies, and the number of the round. The statistically significant estimate of the treatment dummy coefficient suggests that the probability of the senders revealing the draw in the Competition treatment, on average, is 8% higher than in the Baseline (p<0.001). The omitted draw i.e. Draw 1, is the base against which the coefficients of Draw 2, Draw 3, Draw 4, and Draw 5 can be evaluated. The significance of these Draw coefficients suggests that higher draws are revealed significantly more than draw 1 (p<0.001 of all the 'Draw' coefficients). The significant effect of the Round variable suggests that senders learn over rounds even though we do not provide feedback between rounds. Rick and Weber (2010) call this 'Meaningful learning' in the absence of feedback. 10 Model II (column II) specification builds on Model I by including controls such as sex, field of study being economics, being a native English speaker, having a friend in the session, risk aversion, and cognitive ability questions that were measured by a questionnaire. 11, 12 We control for the subject's field of study being Economics because these subjects might be familiar with equilibrium concepts in games such as ours. Controlling for the cognitive ability of a subject helps us examine whether subjects with a higher cognitive ability (as measured by three questions of the Cognitive Reflection Task (Frederick, 2005) who might understand the game better than others, tend to reveal more compared to subjects with a lower score on those questions. We control for subjects' risk preferences which might influence revealing behaviour, i.e. risk-averse subjects might reveal more to avoid a low payoff from receivers' low guess of a non-disclosed draw. 13 We find that our main result of competition increasing the likelihood of revealing numbers remains significant (p=0.002). Cognitive ability has a positive and significant effect on the revealing rate of senders implying that senders who correctly answer at least one of the three cognitive ability questions are more likely to reveal a draw (p=0.001). All other controls are insignificant.
Model III (column III) specification includes controls and a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the sender's believed guess is below the actual number drawn, and 0 otherwise. Using senders' elicited beliefs at the end of each block, we calculate what they believe the receivers would guess upon observing non-disclosure and call it the believed guess of the sender. The believed guess is calculated for each sender and for every block as follows: For example, if the sender believes that upon observing non-disclosure, 30% of receivers guess 1 or 1.5, 25% guess 2 or 2.5, 20% guess 3 or 3.5, 15% guess 4 or 4.5, and 10% guess 5, then the believed guess of this sender is: We assigned a value of 1 to the sender belief dummy (used in the regression) if the draw in a given round is higher than the believed guess elicited at the end of that block, and the dummy took the value of 0 otherwise. We include this dummy in the regression to analyse whether senders' actions are related to their beliefs about the actions of the receivers. The coefficient on sender beliefs is positive and highly significant implying that senders reveal 10% more often if their belief of the receiver's guess upon observing non-disclosure is below the actual draw they observe (p<0.001). The coefficient on the Competition treatment remains positive and statistically significant suggesting that the effect of Competition on senders' revealing behaviour is robust, and competition increases information disclosure.
Result 2: Senders in the Competition treatment reveal 7-8% more than the senders in the Baseline. This is reflected in a significantly lower average non-disclosed number in the Competition treatment compared to the Baseline. However, the amount of information disclosed is still far from the complete unravelling prediction of the theory in both treatments. Figure 2 illustrates the average guess of non-disclosed draws by receivers across the six blocks in the Baseline and the Competition treatment.
Analysis of receivers' behaviour
The difference between the average non-disclosed draw and the guess of the nondisclosed draw by receivers is 0.437 in the Baseline and 0.617 in the Competition treatment. This difference between the non-disclosed draw and the guess of the non-disclosed draw is statistically significant in both treatments implying that receivers are too optimistic in their guesses of the non-disclosed draw (Wilcoxon signed-rank test p=0.027 for both Baseline and Competition treatment). The higher difference between the guess and the non-disclosed draw in the Competition treatment is driven by a significant reduction in the average non-disclosed draw by senders. The regressions in Table 4 confirm these results for receivers' behaviour. Models I, II and III compare receivers' behaviour across the Baseline and the Competition treatment when they observe non-disclosure. The regressions for receivers are estimated using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. The standard errors are clustered at the matching group level.
Model I (column I) is a specification without controls that examines receivers' guess of the non-disclosed number across the Baseline and the Competition treatment. The coefficient on the Competition treatment dummy is negative but not statistically significant (p=0.504). The Round variable is negative and significant implying that receivers learn to guess lower over rounds with experience of playing the game and this is robust across specifications.
Model II (column II) builds on Model I by including socio-demographic controls such as sex, field of study being economics, being a native English speaker, having a friend in the session, risk aversion, cognitive ability, negative reciprocity and general level of reciprocity that were measured by a questionnaire. We include these controls for the same reasons as in sender regressions. We conjecture that subjects motivated by reciprocal concerns guess lower upon observing non-disclosure to punish senders for not revealing a draw. 14 We find that the Competition treatment dummy remains insignificant. In addition, we find that most controls are insignificant, except having a friend in the session and the reciprocity term which are negative and significant (p=0.024 and p=0.004 respectively). This implies that receivers who have a friend in the same session guess 0.236 lower upon observing non- 14 The reciprocity dummies included in the regression take the value of 1 for the receivers with a score of 5 and above on the reciprocity questions, and 0 otherwise. Subjects with a score of 5 and above on the reciprocity questions are regarded as reciprocal. The specific questions are provided in Appendix C: Post-experimental questionnaire and are taken from Falk et al. (2016) . disclosure than receivers without a friend in the session. Receivers who are reciprocal guess 0.585 lower than receivers who are not reciprocal. Model III further includes an interaction term between Round and Competition treatment to examine whether receivers in the Competition treatment guess lower over rounds upon observing non-disclosure. This is because receivers in the Competition treatment interact with two senders in a given round as opposed to one sender in the Baseline and therefore, observe more disclosure of draws over rounds. This might make receivers guess lower upon observing non-disclosure in the Competition treatment in the later rounds of the experiment. Model III also includes the implied guess of the receiver to examine whether their guesses are influenced by the beliefs they hold about the non-disclosed draw. We calculate what the receivers believe the average non-disclosed draw is and call it the implied guess of the receiver. The implied guess is calculated for each receiver and for every block as follows: For example, if the receiver believes that the sender revealing rate is 10% for a private number of 1, 40% for 2, 70% for 3, 90% for 4, and 95% for 5, then the implied guess of this receiver conditional on non-disclosure is: The coefficient on receiver's beliefs about the non-disclosed number is positive and significant (p<0.001). This suggests that receivers' guess of the non-disclosed number increases by 0.546 with a one point increase in their belief of the non-disclosed number. This also gives us a measure of the receivers' ability to best respond to their beliefs about the revealing behaviour of the senders. The interaction term between Round and Competition treatment is not significant however, implying that receivers' guess of the non-disclosed draw over rounds in the Competition treatment does not differ compared to the guess of the receivers in the Baseline (p=0.942).
Result 3:
Despite higher revealing rates in the Competition treatment, there is no significant difference in the average guess of the non-disclosed number by receivers across the Baseline and the Competition treatment.
We conjecture that the variance of receivers' guesses of non-disclosed numbers will be larger in the Competition treatment compared to the Baseline. This is because receivers in the Competition treatment have a more complex decision-problem to solve as they have to base their guesses of non-disclosed numbers on not only what they think the senders' beliefs are about their guess, but also what they think the senders' beliefs are about the other sender's revealing behaviour. We confirm this using a variance ratio test which compares the variances of the two distributions that show the receivers' guess of non-disclosed numbers in Figure 3 below. In line with our conjecture, the result suggests that the variance of the guesses in the Competition treatment is significantly higher than the variance of the guesses in the Baseline (p=0.004). Table 5 provides descriptive statistics of receivers' choice of the preferred sender (in percentages) in the Competition treatment. Recall that receivers are incentivised for accurate reports of the senders' draw, regardless of what the draw actually is. Consistent with these incentives, when one of the two sender reveals the draw, but the other doesn't, receivers tend to prefer the sender who reveals the draw. When both senders reveal, receivers seem to prefer senders who reveal high draws, while they choose less frequently senders who reveal low draws. The preference for senders who reveal higher draws may be explained by receivers' concern to maximise total payoffssenders with high revealed draws earn more than senders with low revealed draws. When both draws are not revealed, we expect receivers to choose the preferred sender randomly. This expectation is confirmed as seen on the bottom right-hand side in the table where receivers choose sender 1 half of the time (50.42%) when both senders send a blank message.
Figure 3: Distribution of guesses of non-disclosed numbers
Analysis of receivers' choice of the sender
Result 4:
Receivers choose senders that reveal the draw. When both senders disclose, most receivers choose the sender with the higher revealed draw. When neither sender reveals the draw, receivers choose randomly between the senders. We next examine whether comparative evaluation of information leads to better guesses about non-disclosed numbers by receivers. To investigate this, we pool our data into two groups. One group consists of receivers' guesses of non-disclosed numbers when one sender does not reveal but the other sender reveals the number. The other group consists of receivers' guesses of non-disclosed numbers when both senders do not reveal the number. We average the guesses for each session in both groups (as each session is an independent unit of observation for receivers in the Competition treatment) and run a non-parametric test on this dataset. We find that receivers' guesses do not differ significantly across the two groups (Wilcoxon rank-sum test p=0.631). This suggests that comparative evaluation of information does not lead to significantly different guesses of non-disclosed numbers relative to the situations where receivers guess in the absence of any information (i.e. number) alongside the non-disclosed number. Result 5: Comparative evaluation of information does not affect receivers' guesses of nondisclosed numbers.
Analysis of receivers' payoffs
In this sub-section, we examine the effect of competition between senders on the welfare of receivers. To do this, we analyse receivers' welfare across treatments using their realised payoffs. The realised payoff is the payoff that the receiver earns after the computer selects the payoff-relevant sender. 15 We find that the realised payoff of receivers in the Competition treatment is significantly higher than the realised payoffs of the receivers in the Baseline (Wilcoxon rank-sum test p=0.010) indicating that receivers are better-off in the Competition treatment.
We identify three potential channels that affect receivers' payoffs in the Competition treatment compared to the Baseline. First, senders reveal more in the Competition treatment than in the Baseline which helps receivers earn a higher payoff. Second, receivers do worse under Competition than in the Baseline when they are matched with a sender that did not disclose the draw. This is because receivers do not guess lower in the Competition treatment compared to the Baseline, while the actual non-disclosed numbers are lower in the Competition treatment. 16 Third, since receivers could choose a sender in the Competition treatment, they could do better by reducing the probability of them being matched with a non-disclosing sender.
Therefore, a more conservative comparison of payoffs switches off the third channel by considering the average payoffs of receivers in the Competition treatment and comparing it to the payoffs of receivers in the Baseline. The average payoffs of receivers in the Competition treatment are calculated by placing an equal weight on the receiver's reports of both senders' draws, i.e. by taking the average of the payoffs that result from the receiver's report of Sender 1's draw and of Sender 2's draw in a given round of the experiment. This method of comparison assumes away the possibility of choosing a sender and provides a conservative estimate of receivers' welfare. We find that, even after abstracting away from the possibility of choosing a sender, receivers earn significantly more in the Competition treatment than in the Baseline and this is marginally significant (Wilcoxon rank-sum test p=0.054). This implies that increased disclosure by senders in the Competition treatment outweighs the fact that receivers do worse when the number is not disclosed to them in the Competition treatment. In conclusion, despite a conservative estimate of receivers' welfare obtained using average payoffs, we find a positive and (marginally) significant effect of competition on the payoffs of receivers. 15 The realised payoffs in the Competition treatment are determined by the computer's selection of the payoffrelevant sender, i.e. with a 75% probability, receiver's preferred sender is selected by the computer, and with a 25% probability the sender who is not preferred by the receiver is selected by the computer as the payoff-relevant sender. 16 Recall that receivers' payoff function implies that the larger the difference between the report of the private number and the true private number, the lower is the payoff for the receiver.
Result 6:
Receivers in the Competition treatment are better-off (in monetary terms) compared to the receivers in the Baseline despite no significant differences in their guesses about the nondisclosed number. This is largely driven by higher revealing rates in the Competition treatment, accompanied with accurate reports of the revealed draws by the receivers.
Beliefs
We now analyse the role of beliefs in driving the behaviour of senders and receivers in the Baseline and the Competition treatment. Senders' beliefs are summarised in Table 6 . On average, the believed guess of senders is 2.213 in the Baseline and 2.184 in the Competition treatment. The difference between the senders' believed guess across treatments is not statistically significant (Wilcoxon rank-sum test p=0.827). 17 We analyse what percentage of the observations were revealed when it was optimal to do so, i.e. when the believed guess was less than the draw. We find that the senders reveal optimally 82.18% in the Baseline and 88.78% in the Competition treatment and this difference is statistically significant (Wilcoxon rank-sum test p=0.006).
In the Baseline, the optimal action was not to reveal the draw when the believed guess was greater or equal to the draw, provided senders are risk-neutral. 86.03% of the observations in the Baseline correspond to the optimal action of not revealing. In the Competition treatment, when the believed guess is greater or equal to the draw, we cannot draw inferences about the optimal action because the revealing behaviour of the sender would also depend on their beliefs about the revealing behaviour of the other sender in the pair. 77.19% of the observations in the Competition treatment were not revealed by senders and this is not significantly different from the withholding rates in the Baseline, i.e. 86.03% (Wilcoxon rank-sum test p=0.197). 18 Result 7: Senders in the Baseline and the Competition treatment have similar believed guesses. When the optimal action is to reveal the draw, senders in the Competition treatment reveal significantly more often than the senders in the Baseline.
Receivers' beliefs about the sender revealing rate and the actual sender revealing rate across the Baseline and the Competition treatment are shown in Figure 4 . The implied guess is 1.985 in the Baseline and 2.088 in the Competition treatment and the difference between the implied guesses across treatments is not statistically significant ( These miscalibrated beliefs of receivers indicate that the average belief of the nondisclosed draw (1.985 in Baseline and 2.088 in the Competition treatment) is higher than the actual average non-disclosed draw (1.846 in Baseline and 1.582 in the Competition treatment), and these differences are statistically significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test p=0.074 for Baseline and p=0.027 for the Competition treatment). We refer to this difference as strategic naivety following Jin et al. (2017) . Put differently, receivers do not sufficiently infer that nondisclosure of a draw implies that the draw is low. 19 Figure 4 : Actual revealing rate and receivers' belief about revealing rate 19 Receivers in the Baseline do not best-respond to their incorrect beliefs, and in fact their guesses are much higher than their beliefs indicate (Wilcoxon signed-rank test p=0.027 between implied guess and actual guess). Receivers in the Competition treatment best-respond to their incorrect beliefs about the non-disclosed number (Wilcoxon signed-rank test p=0.173 between implied guess and actual guess). See Figure A 1 and Figure A 2 in Appendix A for a graphical representation of these statistics.
Result 8:
The implied guess of receivers does not differ significantly across treatments. Strategic naivety in receivers stems from miscalibrated beliefs about the senders' revealing rate of intermediate and high draws as opposed to beliefs about the revealing rate of low draws.
We now explore whether receivers' beliefs about the non-disclosed number are systematically explained by their characteristics. To do this, we regress receiver's implied guess on the Competition treatment dummy and the characteristics of receivers such as sex, field of study being economics, risk aversion, cognitive ability questions, negative reciprocity (Falk et al., 2016) , and the level of scepticism (Hurtt, 2010) measured by a questionnaire. We do a median split of the receivers' score on the Hurtt's scepticism scale (Hurtt, 2010) and calculate a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the receiver's scepticism score is above the median scepticism score, and 0 otherwise. We think that the receivers who score high on the scepticism scale tend to form more accurate, i.e. sceptical beliefs about the nondisclosed number. We present the regression results in Table 7 below.
We find that the implied guess of the receivers with a higher cognitive ability is lower and this implies that these receivers are closer to accuracy given the average revealing behaviour of senders (p=0.002). Our results are similar to those in Gill & Prowse (2016) and Li & Schipper (2018) who find a positive relationship between cognitive ability and participants' level of reasoning in a p-beauty contest game. As mentioned earlier, the implied guess of receivers is not significantly different across treatments and this is confirmed with an insignificant Competition treatment dummy (p=0.376).
Result 9:
Receivers with a higher cognitive ability hold lower, and therefore more accurate beliefs about the non-disclosed number. 
Discussion and conclusion
This paper identifies a market setting to increase disclosure of information in spite of the presence of naïve receivers. We provide experimental evidence to examine whether competition in the market among information senders can lead to the "truths' becoming known…" by substituting the need for receiver scepticism in generating unravelling as highlighted by Milgrom & Roberts (1986) . To investigate this, we compare a setting where a sender competes with another sender to be chosen by the receiver (which can be thought of as firms competing to trade with a receiver) to a setting without competition between senders. We find that when receivers prefer senders that disclose information over those that do not, senders start competing in disclosing information to receivers, thereby significantly increasing the amount of information that is disclosed. This is largely driven by differences in the revealing rates of intermediate draws. The higher rate of information disclosure under competition is consistent with the results in Penczynski & Zhang (2017) who also find that senders in a duopoly reveal more pieces of information in comparison with the senders in a monopoly market structure.
Our results are in contrast to those in Jin (2005) who empirically studies whether Health Maintenance Organisations (HMOs) voluntarily disclose quality information through National Committee of Quality Assurance (NCQA). She finds that the primary reason for disclosing via NCQA is to differentiate from competitors, and in relatively competitive areas, HMOs are less likely to disclose via NCQA over time. We conjecture that the difference between our results is because HMOs could build their reputation in their local areas over time based on quality, and therefore, compete on a different dimension (such as price as opposed to quality) to attract consumers. In contrast, we prevented the possibility of senders forming reputation over rounds by design (i.e. implementing random re-matching) and gave them no other dimension to compete on. Therefore, we find that competition increases disclosure of information in situations characterised by our setting. This paper also explores whether comparative evaluation of information, which is a feature of introducing competition between senders, affects the scepticism and guesses of nondisclosed numbers by receivers. We find that receivers who are presented with information in a comparative manner do not guess significantly lower upon observing non-disclosure than when receivers do not have the option of evaluating information in a comparative manner. Receivers also do not form significantly different beliefs about non-disclosed numbers in the Competition treatment compared to the Baseline.
We believe that comparative evaluation may not have helped in our set-up due to two reasons. First, it is possible that receivers may not have engaged with the "additional" and readily available comparative information provided to them with the presence of another sender alongside. This is because receivers may already have had enough information to consider while making their decisions -such as the payoff table and the draws revealed by senders in the experiment that the receiver was matched with. Therefore, receivers may be imperfectly attentive or cognitively limited to consider any additional information provided to them while making their decisions. Second, receivers' may have thought about what information is revealed rather than what is not revealed during the belief elicitation stage. In other words, framing the belief questions differently may have an impact on the way receivers interpret the non-disclosed information, and this is open to future research. 20 Interestingly, we find that receivers earn a higher payoff in the Competition treatment than in the Baseline despite no significant differences in their guesses of non-disclosed numbers. The results regarding higher welfare in the Competition treatment are in contrast with the results in Penczynski & Zhang (2017) . We reason that the difference may be due to the nature of the games that subjects play in both experiments. In Penczynski & Zhang (2017) , buyers bid a price for the seller's product and in the process, were required to discount for the publication bias of the disclosed pieces of evidence from the set of all available pieces of evidence that the sellers had available to them. In contrast, the decision problem for the receivers in our experiment is simpler compared to theirs, i.e. receivers choose the number if the seller disclosed it to earn the highest possible payoff and guess in the absence of disclosure from the sender.
In conclusion, we provide experimental evidence that shows competition between senders increases disclosure of information even when receivers are naïve about non-disclosed information. This finding can inform policy-makers about conditions under which unravelling of information is more likely to occur. Regulatory authorities can use the tools at their disposal to facilitate competition between firms to increase information disclosure and consumer welfare, particularly in environments that are closely captured by our setup. 
Appendix A
Welcome
Thank you for taking part in this experiment on decision-making. For participating in this experiment, you will be paid a £4 show up fee. Moreover, you will be paid an additional amount of money that will depend on yours and other participants' decision, and on chance. You will be paid in cash, privately at the end of the experiment.
Please silence and put away your mobile phones now.
The entire session will take place through your computer terminal. Please do not talk with other participants during the session.
During this experiment we will calculate your earnings using points. For your final payment, your earnings will be converted into Pounds at the ratio of 75:1 (75 points=£1). Any negative earnings you may make during the experiment will be subtracted from your show-up fee of £4.
We will start with a brief instruction period. During the instruction period you will be given a description of the main features of the experiment. If you have any questions during this period, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to you to answer your question.
Instructions
The experiment consists of 6 blocks with 5 rounds in each block, making it a total of 30 rounds. At the end of each block, you will be asked to answer 5 questions, and at the end of the final block, you will be asked to fill out a questionnaire.
At the beginning of block 1, some of you will be randomly assigned to be the S Player and the others to be the R Player. [If you are assigned to be the S Player, you will further be assigned to be either S Player 1 or S Player 2.] You will remain in these roles for the entire duration of this experiment. [The computer will randomly pair one S Player 1 with one S Player 2 and you will remain in these pairs for the entire duration of this experiment.].
Decision-making stage
In each round, an R Player will be randomly matched with {an S Player} [ 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4, 4.5, 5}. The numbers {1.5, 2.5, 3.5, 4 .5} can be used, for example, when the R Player is unsure about the true value of the private number.
[R Player will also choose her preferred S Player by clicking on the button "Choose S Player 1" or "Choose S Player 2". This choice will determine the earnings for the decision-making stage as described below.]
Earnings for the decision-making stage
[The preferred S Player will be selected by the computer with a 75% probability, and the other S Player with a 25% probability, to be matched with the R Player to earn points. The S Player not selected by the computer will earn 0 points. In other words, the preferred S Player has a higher probability of being selected by the computer to earn points, and the R Player has a higher probability of earning points for her preferred S Player.] The S Player [selected by the computer] will earn the points that result from the report of the R Player. The R Player will earn points based on her own report and the true value of the private number [of the selected S Player]. The specific earnings [for the selected S Player and the R Player] are shown in the table below, which is displayed again before the S Player[s] and the R Player make their decisions. In each cell of the Now please answer questions 1 and 2. After you have finished answering both the questions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to you to check your answers.
1. Calculate the points earned by the players in this round. Suppose that:
The computer program generates the private number for S Player as: 5 S Player chooses not to reveal the private number 5 to the R Player.
Hence, the R Player sees this message on her screen: = 57 points for that round Now please answer questions 1 and 2. After you have finished answering both the questions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to you to check your answers.
Calculate the points earned by the players in this round. Suppose that:
The computer program generates the private number for S Player 1 as: 5
The computer program generates the private number for S Player 2 as: 3
S Player 1 chooses not to reveal the private number 5 to the R Player.
S Player 2 chooses to reveal the private number 3 to the R Player.
Hence, the R Player sees these messages on her screen: In a block, if all S Players have revealed the private number the earnings for that block will be determined at random for the S Players.
At the end of each block, R Players will answer the following 5 questions:
What percentage of S Players do you think revealed the private number:
directions. The stranger offers to take you to your destination. Helping you costs the stranger about 20 Pounds in total. However, the stranger says he or she does not want any money from you. You have 6 presents with you. The cheapest present costs 5 Pounds, the most expensive one costs 30 Pounds. Do you give one of the presents to the stranger as a "thank-you"-gift? If so, which present do you give to the stranger?
No present
The 
